In cumulative prospect theory models, different behavior concerning gains and losses is permitted. For gains different decision weights are assigned than for losses, and the shape of utility can reveal loss aversion. Decision analyses concentrate on both, the capacities, which determine the decision weights, and the nature of utility. This paper focuses on linear/exponential, power and multilinear utility for decision models under uncertainty. Simple preference axioms are formulated for a representation by a cumulative prospect theory function. All models share the following axioms: weak ordering, continuity, monotonicity and tail independence. We first show that in their presence constant absolute (proportional) risk aversion implies linear/exponential (power) utility. Then, in the multiattribute case, considering (mutual) utility independence, it is shown that the utility function is (additive/multiplicative) multilinear.
Introduction
Based on empirical ground cumulative prospect theory (CPT) supports the distinction of outcomes into gains and losses. The cumulative probabilities are transformed according to this separation, and the utility function also reflects that distinction. Kahneman & Tversky (1979) and Tversky & Kahneman (1992) proposed a utility function which is concave for gains, convex for losses, and steeper for losses than for gains. From their experiments, in which lotteries on monetary outcomes were valued, Tversky & Kahneman (1992) concluded that a two-sided power function is a good approximate for the utility function. Different powers for gains than for losses were deduced.
The empirical analysis of Currim and Sarin (1989) confirms the properties of utility and of the weighting functions in the cumulative prospect theory model. They fitted an exponential form for utility, and found evidence for different decision weights for gains than for losses. Smidts (1997) concluded from his data, that a exponential utility fits better than a power utility. In a different experimental study Beetsma and Schotman (1998) conclude that the exponential and the power utility perform equally well.
For decision under risk a complete axiomatization of cumulative prospect theory with a two-part power utility is presented in Wakker & Zank (1997) . There, constant proportional risk aversion of the preference relation determines the nature of utility, in the presence of the simple axioms: weak ordering, continuity, stochastic dominance and tail independence, the latter being a weakening of the independence condition of von Neuman & Morgenstern (1944) .
However, as mentioned above, interest in a special form for utility is not limited to constant proportional risk aversion. Linear/exponential, additive/multiplicative or multilinear utility families are also topic for many analytic studies (Currim & Sarin, 1989; Smidts 1997; Beetsma & Schotman, 1998) . Miyamoto & Wakker (1996) derived models characterizing such families of utilities, assuming the additive representation for a preference relation on rank-ordered acts given beforehand. They point out that, when there is interest in a specific form of utility, preference axioms need not immediately imply a separation of probabilities and utilities in the representing function, but can be weakened to imply only additive representability. Then, in the presence of constant proportional (absolute) risk aversion or utility independence, probabilities and utilities can be identified. This feature will be captured in all our models. First additive representability is established, and from that a cumulative prospect theory functional is derived.
Other parametric families of utilities, focusing on decreasing or increasing risk aversion, were characterized by Farquhar & Nakamura (1987) and Bell (1988) , the so called "polynomial-exponential" utility functions, a family including the "sumex" utilities presented in Nakamura (1996) . Saha (1993) proposed the "expo-power" utility, a form which exhibits decreasing or increasing absolute risk aversion and decreasing or increasing proportional risk aversion, depending on the values of the parameters involved. However, such families will not be discussed here. This paper deals with decision under uncertainty. For a finite set of states, we first derive a CPT-model with linear or exponential utility. Here, the central property of the preference relation is constant absolute risk aversion. This, in addition to weak ordering, monotonicity, continuity and tail independence, constitutes necessary and sufficient axioms for the derivation of such a model. Secondly, we concentrate on a CPT-model with utility as a power function, where constant proportional risk averse preferences are considered.
Thirdly, for multiattribute outcomes, we focus on preferences satisfying mutual util-ity independence or utility independence for attributes, deriving CPT-models with additive/multiplicative or multilinear utility, respectively. Also here the additional axioms are weak ordering, monotonicity, continuity and tail independence, simple axioms, which imply the existence of additive representing functions on rank-ordered sets.
Proofs are presented in the Appendix, except for Lemma 1.
CPT with Linear/Exponential or Power Utility
Throughout this paper S = {1, . . . , n}, with n 3, is a finite set of states, where exactly one state is true and there is uncertainty about which is the true state; subsets of S are events. An act f assigns to each state j ∈ S an outcome f (j), or f j for short. In this section the set of outcomes is the set of real numbers IR, and thus, we view the set of acts as the Cartesian product IR n . Positive outcomes are gains and negative outcomes are losses; they are separated by the zero outcome which is the status quo. Hence, an act f consists of a gain-part f + and a loss-part f − , where f + is the act f with all losses replaced by the status quo, and f − is the act f with all gains replaced by the status quo.
Sometimes we identify the constant act (x, . . . , x) ∈ IR n with the outcome x ∈ IR.
An act f is rank-ordered if its outcomes are ordered as follows: f 1 · · · f n . For each act there exists a permutation ρ of {1, . . . , n} such that f ρ(1) · · · f ρ(n) , i.e. the outcomes are rank-ordered with respect to ρ. For each permutation ρ of {1, . . . , n} the set IR n ρ consists of those acts which are rank-ordered according to ρ. For example, if ρ = id (i.e. ρ(i) = i for all i), then IR n id is the set of rank-ordered acts.
On the set of acts we assume a preference relation denoted by . The symbols , , ∼, , ≺, are defined in the usual way, i.e. f g means [f g and not g f ], f g means [f g and g f ], f g means g f , and f ≺ g means g f .
V is a representing function or representation for if V assigns to each act a real value
If such a representing function exists then is a weak order, i.e. is complete (f g or g f for all acts f, g) and transitive.
One of the best known representations is subjective expected utility (SEU). It holds whenever the representing function has the following form:
The subjective probabilities p i , for i = 1, . . . , n are uniquely determined; they are nonnegative and their sum equals 1. The utility function U maps from the set of outcomes into the reals. In this paper we consider only continuous and strictly increasing utility functions. In the above formula U is cardinal, i.e. unique up to a positive linear transformation. SEU received much attention for several decades. The first complete axiomatic characterization of SEU was provided by Savage (1954) , and many after him formulated preference conditions describing SEU (e.g. Anscombe & Aumann, 1963; Wakker, 1984 Wakker, , 1989 d 'Aspremont & Gevers, 1990; Gul, 1992) .
Choquet expected utility (CEU) holds if the representing function has the following form:
Here, outcomes are first rank-ordered and then they are valued by the representing function. U is again cardinal. The π ρ,j , for j = 1, . . . , n are decision weights defined as follows
where ν : 2 S → [0, 1] is a capacity, i.e. ν(∅) = 0, ν(S) = 1 and ν(A B) ν(A) for all events A, B. Under CEU the capacity is unique. Consequently, the decision weights are uniquely determined, they are nonnegative and sum to one for each permutation ρ.
Capacities are nonadditive extensions of probability measures, thus, whenever ν in (1) is additive, CEU reduces to SEU above. CEU was introduced by Schmeidler (1989) for decision under uncertainty (see also Gilboa, 1987; Wakker, 1989; Nakamura, 1990 , Chew & Karni, 1994 .
In this paper we focus on cumulative prospect theory (CPT). The representing CPTfunction is defined next. Let f be an act such that for some k ∈ {0, . . . , n} and ρ we have
where k = 0 means that all outcomes are negative and k = n means that all outcomes are nonnegative. The CPT-function has the following form
Here the continuous strictly increasing utility function U is required to satisfy U (0) = 0, and is a ratio scale, i.e. U is unique up to multiplication by a positive real number. For the decision weights we have different uniquely determined capacities: ν + for gains and ν − for losses. They are defined as follows. For i k (the gain-part of f ) we have similarly
For j > k (the loss-part of f ) we have
The CPT-value in (2) can be viewed as the sum of two CEU-values. The first sum is the CEU-value of the gain-part f + with respect to the capacity ν + , and the second sum is the 6 CEU-value of the loss-part f − with respect to the dual of ν − (recall that here U (0) = 0).
The CEU-form for losses coincides with the original CEU-form, when in the definition of the decision weights ν − ({ρ(j), . . . , ρ(n)}) is replaced by 1 − ν − (S\{ρ(1), . . . , ρ(j − 1)}).
Moreover, we can write
in agreement with Tversky & Kahneman (1992) . Aggregating those two values results in the final "worth" of the act. This feature is also exhibited in the proofs (see Appendix).
First CPT will be established for gains and then CPT for losses is derived. Then, both parts merge into the general CPT-function.
In this section first preference axioms are formulated such that the utility function in 
Under CPT utility satisfies U (0) = 0. Therefore, in (i) we dropped the location parameter, and in (ii) the only possibility for the location parameter is τ = −α. In the above definition only the form of utility is described. Clearly the parameters α, β, λ can be different for gains than for losses.
The central property for a preference relation to identify utility as a linear/exponential function is constant absolute risk aversion for gains and for losses. For gains (losses) it is defined as follows
whenever for all i = 1, . . . , n the outcomes f i , f i + ε, g i , g i + ε are gains (losses).
Before formulating the next preference condition some notation is introduced. For an event I ⊆ S and f, h ∈ IR n by h I f we denote the act which results from f by replacing f i with h i for each state i ∈ I; for states we write h j f instead of h {j} f . We can now introduce the independence property for .
Definition The preference relation on IR n satisfies tail independence if the following holds:
whenever I = {ρ (1), . . . , ρ(m)} or I = {ρ(l), . . . , ρ(n)} for some m, l ∈ S, and all acts in question are from the same set IR n ρ .
Tail independence requires that the preference between two acts is independent of common outcomes if, first, the acts are rank-ordered with respect to the same permutation, and second, if after rank-ordering those acts have their common outcomes placed in the first m or last (n − l + 1) consecutive states. Thus, tail independence not only restricts the sure thing principle of Savage (1954) to comonotonic acts (called comonotonic independence in Chew & Wakker, 1996) , but in addition it further restricts comonotonic independence to hold for states in which common outcomes are best or worst. Cumulative prospect theory satisfies tail independence as is shown in the next lemma. In order to clarify the nature of CPT the proof is added into the main text.
Lemma 1 CPT implies tail independence.
Proof: Under CPT we have
for all acts f, g ∈ IR n .
Let f, g ∈ IR n ρ for some permutation ρ of the states. The following is implied by the above equivalence
Assuming now that f, g have common best outcomes, i.e. for some m ∈ S we have
. . , m, we conclude that the inequality is independent of the first m summands. Hence, for i ∈ I := {1, . . . , m}, we can replace f ρ(i) , g ρ(i) by arbitrary common outcomes h ρ(i) without affecting that inequality. Therefore, we can choose h ρ(i) ,
Because ρ and m are arbitrarily chosen, independence of common best outcomes holds.
Similarly we can show that independence holds for common worst outcomes, which then implies tail independence of , and thus completes the proof.
The preference relation on IR n satisfies monotonicity if f g whenever f i g i for all states i with a strict inequality for at least one state.
The continuity condition defined here is with respect to the Euclidean topology on IR n :
satisfies continuity if for any act f the sets {g ∈ IR n |g f } and {g ∈ IR n |g f } are closed subsets of IR n .
Theorem 2 Assume n 3. For a preference relation on IR n the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) CPT holds, with a continuous strictly increasing linear/exponential utility and positive decision weights.
(ii) The preference relation satisfies the following conditions: weak ordering, monotonicity, continuity, tail independence, and constant absolute risk aversion for gains and for losses. If (i) holds then the capacities are uniquely determined and the utility function is a ratio scale.
Next, we concentrate on the CPT-model with "power" utility. It is the most-used nonexpected utility form nowadays. For references see Wakker and Zank (1998) . They provided an axiomatization of CPT with power utility for decision under risk. Here an extension of their results to decision under uncertainty is given.
A function U : IR → IR is from the positive power family for gains if
and it is from the positive power family for losses if
Recall that under CPT we require strict increasingness and U (0) = 0 for the utility function. Hence, in the above definitions all parameters are positive and no location parameter is added.
The property of which determines power utility is constant proportional risk aversion for gains and for losses. For gains (losses) it is defined as follows
for all ε > 0 whenever all outcomes are gains (losses).
Theorem 3 Assume n 3. For a preference relation on IR n the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) CPT holds, with a positive power utility for gains and for losses, and positive decision weights.
(ii) The preference relation satisfies the following conditions: weak ordering, monotonicity, continuity, tail independence, and constant proportional risk aversion for gains and for losses. If (i) holds then the capacities are uniquely determined, and the utility function is a ratio scale.
CPT with Multilinear and Additive/Multiplicative Utility
Recall that in this paper we consider a finite set of states, S = {1, . . . , n} for a natural number n 3, where exactly one state is true and there is uncertainty about which is the true state. An act f assigns to each state j an outcome f j . In this section we denote the set of outcomes by X, and X is the product of a finite number of nondegenerate intervals X 1 , . . . , X r , r 2, called attribute sets. An outcome x ∈ X can be written as a tuple x = (x 1 , . . . ,x r ) with attribute x t ∈ X t . Again we can view the set of acts as the product X n . Sometimes we identify the constant act (x, . . . , x) ∈ X n with the outcome x ∈ X.
For simplicity, we assume that each attribute X t contains the zero value in its interior.
Therefore, X contains the zero outcome, which is the status quo. Actually any other outcome in X can play the role of the status quo. However, by rescaling the values in each attribute set we can ensure that the zero outcome becomes the status quo. Moreover, for money, zero as status quo is widely accepted in empirical work (see Kahneman & Tversky, 1979 ).
On the set of acts X n we assume a preference relation denoted by . The restriction of to the constant acts (and therefore to X) is also denoted by . Gains and losses are now defined not only with respect to the status quo, but also depend on the preference relation on X. Outcomes x 0 are gains and outcomes x ≺ 0 are losses. Note that here gains and losses can contain both positive and negative attributes. Therefore, the "aggregated worth" of an outcome among its r attributes indicates if the outcome is a gain or a loss or is indifferent to the status quo.
Rank-ordering is also defined with respect to the preference relation on X: an act
Similar to section 2 we denote by X n ρ the set of acts that are rank-ordered according to ρ, where ρ is a permutation of the states {1, . . . , n}.
Weak ordering, continuity and tail-independence are defined analogously to section 2.
The preference relation on X n satisfies outcome-monotonicity if for all acts f, g ∈ X n , f i g i for all states i implies f g, with a strict preference if for a state j we have f j g j . The preference relation on X n satisfies attribute-monotonicity if for all outcomes x, y ∈ X, [x = y and x t y t for all t = 1, . . . , r] implies x y.
For a subset T of {1, . . . , r} and outcomes z, x ∈ X we define z T x as the outcome with attribute z t for t ∈ T and x t for t ∈ T c , where T c := {1, . . . , r}\T . We denote by X T a factor, which is defined as X T := {X t |t ∈ T }. Instead of X {t} we use X t . In this section the central property is utility independence for factors restricted to rank-ordered sets, defined next:
Definition Let T ⊆ {1, . . . , r}. The factor X T is utility independent for gains
holds, whenever all acts in question are contained in X n ρ for some ρ, and all outcomes are gains (losses).
This property determines the following family of utility functions ( Theorem 4). A function U : X → IR is multilinear if there exist functions U t : X t → IR for t = 1, . . . , r and constants δ T ∈ IR for all T ⊆ {1, . . . , r} such that
Utility independence is a central tool in Keeney & Raiffa's (1976) multiattribute utility theory. We define the property not only according to the separation into gains and losses but also restrict it to rank-ordered acts.
Theorem 4 Assume n 3. For a preference relation on X n the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) CPT holds, with a continuous multilinear utility, strictly increasing in each attribute, and with positive decision weights.
(ii) The preference relation satisfies the following conditions: weak ordering, outcomemonotonicity, attribute-monotonicity, continuity, tail independence, and for each factor X t , t = 1, . . . , r, utility independence for gains and for losses. If (i) holds then the capacities are uniquely determined and the utility function is a ratio scale.
Mutual utility independence holds for gains (losses) whenever X T is utility independent for gains (losses) for all T ⊆ {1, . . . , r}. This property characterizes additive/ multiplica-
and
. , r.
A function is additive/multiplicative if it is either additive or multiplicative.
Theorem 5 Assume n 3. For a preference relation on X n the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) CPT holds, with a continuous additive/multiplicative utility, strictly increasing in each attribute, and with positive decision weights.
(ii) The preference relation satisfies the following conditions: weak ordering, outcomemonotonicity, attribute-monotonicity, continuity, tail independence, and mutual utility independence for gains and for losses. Choquet expected utility holds, and thus on IR n CPT holds for . We complete the proof of statement (i) by deriving uniqueness results .
Lemma 6
The preference relation on IR n id is represented by the additive function
with continuous strictly increasing functions V 1 , . . . , V n : IR → IR, which are uniquely determined satisfying V j (0) = 0 for all j and n j=1 V j (1) = 1.
Proof: The proof follows immediately from Lemma 7 in Wakker & Zank (1997) . There, the statement is formulated for a preference relation on a set of simple lotteries (i.e. finite probability distributions over IR) with rank-ordered outcomes. However, they fix a finite probability distribution, such that only outcomes can vary, which results in a set isomorphic to IR n id . Then our statement results.
Lemma 7 On the set of rank-ordered acts with nonnegative outcomes the representation 15 of Lemma 6 agrees with the following function
where U id is a strictly increasing linear/exponential utility function, satisfying U id (0) = 0 and U id (1) = 1, and the decision weights π + id,j , for j = 1, . . . , n, are all positive. Utility and the decision weights are uniquely determined.
Proof: We have given the preference relation on IR n id , which is represented by the function n j=1 V j with the V j 's as described in Lemma 6. Moreover satisfies constant absolute risk aversion on IR n ++,id , i.e. the set of rank-ordered acts with positive outcomes.
We define U id (x) = n j=1 V j (x) for all nonnegative x. Therefore, by Lemma 6 U id becomes unique satisfying U id (0) = 0, U id (1) = 1.
Let us fix some 1 i < n. We restrict our analysis to acts with identical outcomes for the first i states and for the last n − i states, i.e. to acts f with f j = x for j = 1, . . . , i and f j = y for j = i + 1, . . . , n, for outcomes x, y with x y 0. We denote these acts by (x, y) i . On this two-dimensional subset the preference relation is represented by Considering only gains (y > 0), Miyamoto & Wakker (1996, Theorem 1) show that Z i and W i are proportional, which obviously remains valid when the zero outcome is included.
Moreover, Z i and W i are proportional to their sum, which is U id . Therefore, by Miyamoto & Wakker, they are of the form Z i = π Z i · U id and W i = π W i · U id , for positive uniquely determined π Z i , π W i , which sum to one. Further, Miyamoto & Wakker concluded that the utility function U id is from the increasing linear/exponential family for gains. This analysis holds for any fixed 1 i < n.
We define now π
. . , n − 1, and π + id,n := π W n−1 .
Monotonicity implies that all the π + id,j 's are positive. By their definition they are uniquely determined and sum to one. Then, we can compute V 1 = Z 1 = π + id,1 · U id , and inductively
Finally, from this analysis, we conclude that on IR n +,id the representation of Lemma 6 agrees with the function in (3). This concludes the proof of Lemma 7.
Lemma 8 On the set of rank-ordered acts with nonpositive outcomes the representation of Lemma 6 agrees with the following function
where U id is a strictly increasing linear/exponential utility function, satisfying U id (0) = 0, and the decision weights π − id,j , for j = 1, . . . , n, are all positive. Utility and the decision weights are uniquely determined.
Proof: The proof is similar to the one of Lemma 7. We can view the "problem"
and the preference relation * is defined as follows:
Therefore * is a continuous monotonic weak order satisfying tail independence and constant absolute risk aversion for gains. Moreover, * is represented by
with the V j 's as described in 
and on IR n −,ρ with the function
The utility function U ρ is from the increasing linear/exponential family for both gains and losses, satisfying U ρ (0) = 0 and U ρ (1) = 1, and the decision weights π Proof (only for the case f ∈ IR n + ): Take any act f ∈ IR n +,ρ . Let x be the maximal and y the minimal outcome of f . Monotonicity of implies x f y. Thus, the following equivalence holds
and, by continuity of U , there exists x f ∈ IR + , with CEU 
). Further, because utility is the same for all CEU-forms, it follows that CEU
By setting f = g, this implies that CEU Recall that the act 1 I 0 assigns outcome 1 to the states in I and outcome 0 elsewhere. Now define ν + (I) := CEU + (1 I 0) for all I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. Obviously, ν + is a capacity on S.
Moreover the following holds
for j = 1, . . . , n and any permutations ρ of the states. Because the decision weights are uniquely determined, by the above definition the capacity ν + is unique.
Let us summarize: The preference relation on IR 
for j = 1, . . . , n and any permutations ρ of the states. Now let f be an act containing both gains and losses. Suppose f ∈ IR n ρ for a permutation ρ of {1, . . . , n}. There exists a k ∈ {1, . . . , n} with
Then, with f + the gain part of f , f − the loss part of f , and the V ρ j 's from Lemma 9, the following holds
which, by the results above, is equivalent to
Therefore, the additive representations for on IR n ρ described in Lemma 9 can be considered as restrictions of a common function, defined by f → CEU
Obviously, this function represents the preference relation on the entire set of acts IR n , and it is a CPT-function as described in (2), with a increasing linear/exponential utility function for gains and for losses U , which satisfies U (0) = 0 and U (1) = 1. Utility and the capacities ν + , ν − are uniquely determined by the analysis made separately for gains and for losses. Hence, we conclude the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 3: That statement (i) implies (ii) is immediate. The proof of (i) from
(ii) is analogous to that in the proof of Theorem 2. The difference is that for the preference relation here constant absolute risk aversion is replaced by constant proportional risk aversion. In Lemma 6 this is not yet relevant, therefore Lemma 6 holds here. Constant absolute risk aversion was relevant in Lemma 7. Considering constant proportional risk aversion instead, Lemma 7 remains valid if we replace "U id is a strictly increasing linear/exponential utility function" by "U id is from the positive power family". Then in the proof we have to use Theorem 2 of Miyamoto & Wakker (1996) instead of their Theorem 1. Other than that, the proof can entirely be adapted with a positive power utility U id instead of a linear exponential one.
Similarly, the Lemmas 8 and 9 remain valid with power utility instead of linear/exponential utility. Moreover, the analysis following the proof of Lemma 9 can entirely be repeated The first difference consists in the existence of "extreme acts". An outcome x ∈ X is maximal if for no other outcome y ∈ X, we have y x, and x is minimal if for no other outcome y ∈ X, we have y ≺ x. An act assigning to each state a maximal outcome or to each state a minimal outcome is an extreme act. Wakker (1993) pointed out difficulties for additive representability on rank-ordered sets, in the presence of extreme acts. They had to be excluded in order to derive additive representability. Under proportionality of the functions in the additive representation on the set of nonminimal and nonmaximal outcomes, as will be derived here, extensions to extreme acts were possible (see Proposition 3.5 in Wakker, 1993) .
Lemma 11
The preference relation on X n id \{extreme acts} is represented by the additive
with continuous functions V 1 , . . . , V n : X → IR, which preserve the ordering of outcomes, and are uniquely determined satisfying V j (0) = 0 for all j and n j=1 V j (w) = 1 for some fixed w 0.
Proof: The proof follows by similar reasonings to those used in the proof of Lemma 7 of Wakker & Zank (1997) . There it is described how tail independence implies, first locally then globally, the additivity axioms required in Chateauneuf & Wakker (1993) . Then by satisfies attribute monotonicity and for each attribute set X j,+ (z) utility independence for gains on X n +,id (z)\{extreme acts}. we have x y z, instead of Theorem 1 of Miyamoto & Wakker (1996) we use Theorem 5, and monotonicity is replaced by outcome-monotonicity. Except for these changes the proof of Lemma 7 can entirely be repeated here.
We conclude that on X n +,id (z)\{extreme acts} the representation of Lemma 11 agrees with the function in (7). This concludes the proof of Lemma 12.
Let nowẑ,z ∈ int(X) withẑ ∼z ∼ 0 be any distinct outcomes. (Such outcomes exist because r 2, and because on X the preference relation is a continuous weak order, satisfying attribute-monotonicity.) Then, the outcome y, defined by y t := max{ẑ t ,z t } for all t = 1, . . . , r, is contained in int(X), and by attribute monotonicity satisfies y 0.
A similar analysis as in the proof of Lemma 12 can be made here, such that we can conclude that on X n +,id (y)\{extreme acts} the additive function in Lemma 11 agrees with
with uniquely determined multilinear utility function U . . , n. Moreover, becauseẑ andz were arbitrarily chosen from int(X), we conclude that the function in (7) is independent of z, and thus we can suppress the index z in (7).
Recall, that we restricted the above analysis to z ∈ int(X) such that z ∼ 0. Doing so, the outcomes where U id is not yet defined are boundary outcomes of X. But for these boundary outcomes, viewed as constant acts, the function n j=1 V j is defined (except for the extreme acts), and thus, we can continuously extend U id to those outcomes by U id := n j=1 V j , preserving multilinearity.
In Lemma 11 we excluded the extreme acts. However, later in the analysis, we concluded that the V j 's in Lemma 11 are proportional. Then, by Proposition 3.5 of Wakker (1993), we can extend n j=1 V j to the extreme acts which are gains, and thus, U id to the entire set X +,id . Finally we conclude the following:
Lemma 13 On the set X 
where U id is a multilinear utility function, preserving the ordering on X, and increasing in each attribute; U id satisfies U id (0) = 0, U id (w) = 1; the decision weights π Other than that, the proof can entirely be adapted with a additive/multiplicative utility 
